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Abstract
We consider a model of bribery in procurement first-price auctions. The auctioneer cannot
award the contract at a price above the winning bid at the auction, but can award the contract
to a “dishonest” supplier who submitted a bid above that of the honest supplier. Despite this,
bribery does not eliminate the incentive of the dishonest supplier to win the auction outright
without a bribe. In fact, bribery may even induce the dishonest supplier to bid more
aggressively. We study the allocative distortion caused by bribery in a model of asymmetric
bidders. We find that the distortion may actually result in a lower expected price paid by the
buyer when the dishonest supplier is “stronger” in that he has a more favorable distribution of
costs than the honest supplier. However, the incentives for cost-reducing investment by the
suppliers are reduced by bribery and result in a lower level of industry investment than the social
optimum.
1.  Introduction
Bribery has it antecedents in the practice of reciprocity in early civilizations.  In a sense,
reciprocity is a form of contract in which a government official is expected to perform some
action in return for a payment.  In early civilizations, reciprocity was the norm.  With time,
certain types of reciprocity became socially unacceptable and subject to penalties. This process
was driven by both legal and religious forces. The norm of reciprocity first became unacceptable
for judges and courts. Later, it became unacceptable for other government officials. The term
bribery means an illegal form of reciprocity with government officials.
In the United States, there are two important statutes making bribery a criminal offense.
First, there is the federal statute entitled Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses (18 USC
201). This statute applies to bribery of federal officials. Second, there is a federal statute entitled
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 USC 78). This statute was enacted in 1977 and applies
to bribery of foreign officials by American corporations.3
In this paper, we will use the term bribery to mean a side-payment to a decision-maker
in order to alter a decision on the merits in favor of the person making the side-payment.  In
particular, the decision-maker is an auctioneer who represents a buyer of some good. The
buyer may be viewed as a government and the auctioneer as a government official.
Alternatively, the buyer may simply be another corporation and the auctioneer an employee of
the corporation. The person who makes a bribe is one of the suppliers willing to produce the
good. The favor conferred by the auctioneer is to award the contract for production of the good
to the supplier offering the bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the
merits. Even though the auctioneer cannot alter the price, she can favor the supplier by awarding
him the contract at that winning price. In effect, the auctioneer allows the bribing supplier to
resubmit his bid.
This type of bribery alters the bidding strategies and distorts the allocation of the
contract, but does not supplant the first-price auction. In the model, we examine the implications
of bribery when only one supplier can offer bribes to the auctioneer. This asymmetric structure
has interesting applications in the international competition among corporations for public
projects in various countries.  In particular, one might expect that domestic suppliers are in a
better position than foreign suppliers to bribe the official auctioneer. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act has criminal penalties for bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations. Thus,
U.S. corporations are in a weak position to bribe foreign officials in order to obtain contracts
for public projects in their countries. Conversely, the foreign country may have no laws or
enforcement preventing bribery of its officials by domestic corporations. Even if no domestic
corporations could supply the public project, corporations from differing countries competing
for the public project would have differing laws or enforcement with respect to bribery of
foreign officials. Until very recently, several European countries allowed their national
corporations to have a tax deduction for bribes paid to foreign officials.
The asymmetry in the ability of suppliers to bribe may also arise in the competition for
public projects within a country. For instance, large national suppliers may have valuable
reputations which would be damaged by a criminal conviction for bribery. Thus, these suppliers
may have internal rules prohibiting and punishing bribery. However, smaller local suppliers may4
not have similar reputations, and may be more willing to risk bribery convictions in order to win
contracts.
Finally, the asymmetry assumption may be an appropriate in many private procurement
cases. Most corporations have internal rules prohibiting employees from accepting bribes in
return for awarding contracts to suppliers. Employees accepting such bribes could be punished
by being demoted or fired from their jobs. In addition, the suppliers who paid bribes to
employees of the corporation could be blacklisted from future contracts with the corporation.
Some suppliers may then prefer to compete without using bribes, while other suppliers may be
willing to take the risk of losing future business.
The existence of bribery as defined in this model does not eliminate the incentives for the
dishonest supplier to submit meaningful bids in the first-price auction. Indeed, winning the
contract by offering the lowest price allows the supplier to avoid paying the bribe. However, the
bidding behavior is distorted. We show that the direction of this bidding distortion, whether
more or less aggressive, is unclear. However, it is clear that the bidding distortion induces an
allocative distortion in which the contract is awarded to the dishonest bidder too often.
An  allocative distortion is typical of first-price auctions. However, in contrast to a
honest first-price auction, bribery always distorts the allocation in favor of the dishonest bidder,
whether he has the most favorable distribution of costs or not. The effect of this distortion on the
price paid by the buyer is ambiguous. Depending on the magnitude of the bribe and the
asymmetry of the suppliers, we show that the price may actually be lower under bribery. What
is more surprising is that this may be the case even when the dishonest supplier has the most
favorable distribution of costs.
Finally, we analyze the effects of bribery on the incentives of suppliers to invest in cost
reduction. The result is unambiguous in that the first-price auction with bribery results in a lower
total investment. However, the magnitude of the bribe determines whether the dishonest supplier
invests more or less than the honest supplier.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we characterize the model of bribery in
a first-price auction. In section 3, we examine the equilibrium bidding functions for general cost
distributions. This section provides some intuition on how the equilibrium bidding functions of the5
two suppliers would be affected by bribery, but concludes that that there are no general results.
In section 4, we define a convenient family of distributions for the costs of the suppliers. This
family allows for a tractable solution of the equilibrium bidding functions when the suppliers have
differing cost distributions.  In section 5, we employ the equilibrium bidding functions from
section 4 to examine the allocative distortions caused by bribery, the expected price paid by the
buyer, and the expected bribe received by the auctioneer. Section 6 analyzes how bribery
affects the incentives for investment in cost reduction. Section 7 discusses certain modeling
issues, and section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
2.  The Model of Bribery
The buyer has a value v for products with a fixed quantity and quality. The buyer
employs an auctioneer to receive bids and award a contract to purchase the products from one
of two suppliers using a sealed-bid first-price auction. The contract would normally be awarded
to the supplier with the lowest bid at a price equal to that bid.  However, the auctioneer can be
bribed by one of the suppliers, called the “dishonest” supplier.  In return for a bribe, the
auctioneer awards the contract to the dishonest supplier by allowing him to revise his bid
downward in order to match the lower bid of the “honest” supplier.
We assume that each supplier draws his cost of production ci, where i = d,h , from a
distribution Gi(c) with support [0,1] common to both suppliers, and a positive density gi(c) over
this support.  The cost ci is private information for each supplier, but the distribution functions
are common knowledge. For simplicity, we also assume that the value of the buyer exceeds the
highest possible cost realization (v > 1). Finally, we assume that the costs of the suppliers are
independently distributed. Thus, we will introduce bribery into an asymmetric independent
private value (cost) first-price auction.  In general, it is difficult to solve for the equilibrium bid
functions in asymmetric first-price auctions.  However, the first-price auction becomes more
tractable with bribery by one dishonest supplier.
We assume that the auctioneer must run a sealed-bid first-price auction and must award
the contract at a price equal to the lowest bid, but not necessarily to the supplier who made the6
lowest bid. In addition, we assume that only one of the suppliers is dishonest and can offer a
bribe to the auctioneer. Thus, if the bid of the dishonest supplier is higher than that of the honest
supplier, he can bribe the auctioneer in order to obtain the contract at the price bid by the
honest supplier. Let bd and bh, be the bid of the dishonest and honest suppliers respectively. If
bd < bh, the contract is assigned to the dishonest supplier at a price bd. However, if bd > bh, but
cd < bh, the contract is awarded to the dishonest supplier at a price bh, but only after paying the
auctioneer a fraction a of the surplus bh - cd. We call a the “percentage bribe”. Finally, if bh <
cd the honest bidder is awarded the contract at a price equal to his bid. Notice that we are
implicitly assuming that the auctioneer knows the dishonest supplier’s cost. We will comment on
this in section 7.
We assume that the percentage bribe a is determined prior to the auction and thus is
independent of the outcome of the auction. We also assume that the dishonest supplier knows
the value of a prior to bidding. We need not assume that the honest supplier knows the value of
a, but only the existence of bribery that would award the contract to the dishonest supplier
when cd < bh.
The ability to bribe the auctioneer does not imply that the dishonest supplier would not
attempt to win the contract outright by bidding below the honest supplier. In general, the bribe is
a “cost” to the dishonest supplier so he will submit bids that have a positive probability of
winning the contract outright.
With this specification of bribery, the buyer obtains some of the benefits of competition
in that the equilibrium price is determined by a sealed-bid first-price auction.  However, bribery
will generally alter the equilibrium bidding functions of both the dishonest and the honest
supplier.
3.  General Results on the Bidding Functions
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium sealed-bid first-price auction for a given
percentage bid assuming general distribution functions for the costs of the honest and dishonest
suppliers. We find that the introduction of bribery does not generate unambiguous results for the7
shift in the equilibrium bidding functions. For example, one cannot conclude that the dishonest
supplier bids less aggressively when he has the ability to bribe the auctioneer. Similarly, one
cannot conclude that the honest supplier bids more aggressively when he knows that the
dishonest supplier can bribe the auctioneer.
Given our assumptions about the bribing process, the honest supplier is effectively
bidding against cost of the dishonest supplier. As a result, his bidding strategy is independent of
the bidding strategy of the dishonest supplier.
1 Similarly, his bidding strategy is also independent
of the percentage bribe a. From the viewpoint of the honest supplier, the bribe is simply a
transfer between the dishonest supplier and the auctioneer.  Indeed, the honest supplier
calculates his bidding strategy by solving the following problem:
(1)      [ ] [ ] ) ( 1 ) ( ; max b G c b c b b d h - - = P .
The first-order condition of this problem is
(2)      [ ] , 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 = - - - b g c b b G d d
which implies that the optimal bidding function for the honest supplier,  ) (c bh , is the implicit
function defined by 
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This bidding function of the honest supplier is equivalent to the best take-it-or-leave-it offer that
a seller with cost c of producing some object can make to a buyer with random valuation in the
interval [ ] 1 , 0  given by the distribution function Gd.
Since the bidding function of the honest supplier is a dominant strategy, the dishonest
supplier can take this bidding function as given when calculating its bidding strategy.  Thus, the
optimal bidding function of the dishonest supplier is obtained by solving the following problem:
                                                
1  This assumes that the dishonest supplier does not submit bids below his realized costs.
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The first term is the expected profit of the dishonest supplier when he wins the auction outright,
and thus pays no bribe. The second term is the expected profit of the dishonest supplier when
he loses the auction (b > bh), but bribes the auctioneer because his costs are below the bid of
the honest supplier (c < bh). We refer to the difference between the contract price bh and the
cost realization of the dishonest supplier as the “surplus” which can be divided between the
dishonest supplier and the auctioneer. In this case, the dishonest supplier retains the fraction (1
- a) of this surplus. The first order condition for this problem is
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which implies that the optimal bidding function of the dishonest supplier,  ) (c bd , is the implicit
function defined by
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assuming that this solution is interior on the range of bids [bh(0),bh(1)] of the honest supplier.
The dishonest supplier would never offer a bid below the minimum bid that honest supplier
would offer. Thus, if the solution to (6) is below  ) 0 ( h b , the dishonest supplier also bids  ) 0 ( h b .
Note that bh(1) = bd(1) = 1, as usual.
We can now examine the effect of bribery on the behavior of the suppliers. One might
expect the honest supplier to bid more aggressively in the presence of bribery. The reason is
that the honest supplier has to bid below the cost, rather than the bid, of the dishonest supplier.
In addition, one might expect the dishonest supplier to bid less aggressively. The reason is that
the dishonest supplier need not lose the contract simply because he lost the auction. The
dishonest supplier can still obtain the contract by a bribe and would choose to do so when there
exists some surplus at the price determined by the bid of the honest supplier. Despite the9
compelling nature of these two intuitions, neither is true in general. In particular, the equilibrium
bidding functions depend on the distribution functions for the costs of the suppliers.
In order to obtain the intuition for this lack of general results, consider the symmetric
case, where Gd = Gh , and compare the two first-order conditions (2) and (5) above. The first
term in each condition is the incentive to raise the bids caused by the increase in revenue on
contracts that the supplier wins outright in the auction. For a given cost, common to both
suppliers, this first term in (2) for the honest supplier is always less than the corresponding term
in (5) for the dishonest supplier. For this reason, the honest supplier has a lower incentive to
raise his bid, making him more aggressive (lower bids at any cost realization). This corresponds
to the intuition that the honest supplier must bid against the costs of the dishonest supplier, rather
that his bid.
The second term in the two first-order conditions is the disincentive to raise the bids
caused by the reduced profit on contracts that are lost. The second term for the dishonest
supplier is multiplied by a , which is less than 1. For this reason, it would appear that the
dishonest supplier has a lower disincentive to raise his bid, making him less aggressive (higher
bids at any cost realization). Indeed, the fact that the dishonest supplier can bribe the auctioneer
when he loses the auction reduces his disincentive to raise his bid. This corresponds to the
intuition that the dishonest supplier has a second chance to obtain the contract through bribery.
However, there is an additional factor in the second term of the first-order condition of
the dishonest supplier. In particular, the second term for the dishonest supplier is multiplied by
the factor 
db
b dbh ) ( 1 -
.  This factor is the slope of the inverse bidding function of the honest
supplier and represents the probability of losing the auction as a consequence of raising his bid.
This results in a loss of the percentage a of the surplus. Whenever the margin between bid and
cost of the honest supplier, bh(c) - c, is decreasing in c (for example, whenever  gd(c) is
nondecreasing), this factor is greater than 1, which is the slope of the effective distribution of
bids (costs) by the dishonest supplier facing the honest supplier. As a result, the dishonest
supplier experiences a larger increment in the probability of losing the auction outright when he10
increases his bid marginally. Thus, this factor increases the disincentive of the dishonest supplier
to raise his bid, making him more aggressive. The new force works against the two previous
forces, and suggests that no general result can be obtained for the relative aggressiveness of the
honest and dishonest suppliers in the auction. We provide an example below which illustrates
the ambiguity.
Now consider the comparison between the bidding functions with bribery and
equilibrium bidding functions if there is no bribery of the auctioneer. The first-order condition for
the bidding function of supplier i with an honest auctioneer is
(7) [ ] , 0
) (
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where j denotes the other supplier. When we compare this condition to the first-order condition
(2) for the honest supplier, we find that the same tradeoffs apply.  In particular, the first term
representing the incentive to increase the bid would be larger without bribery.  However, the
second term representing the disincentive to increase the bid will also be larger because the
factor 
db
b dbj ) ( 1 -
 may well be larger than 1.  Thus, the total effect may be ambiguous, and it is
unclear whether bribery will make the honest supplier more or less aggressive in his bidding.
As an illustration of this ambiguity, we have computed the equilibrium bidding functions
for the symmetric case where Gh(c) = Gd(c) = c
2.  Figure 1 illustrates these bidding functions
(the solutions to (2), (5), and (7)). The dashed line represents the bidding function without
bribery.  The solid lines represent the bidding functions for the honest (darker) and dishonest
(lighter) suppliers.  With bribery, the bidding functions of the honest and dishonest suppliers
cross at approximately c = .6.  The honest supplier bids more aggressively than the dishonest
supplier at low cost realizations, but less aggressively at high cost realizations. In addition, the
honest supplier may bid more or less aggressively that he would without bribery. The bidding
functions of the honest supplier, with and without bribery, cross at approximately c = .3. Bribery
induces the honest supplier to bid more aggressively for high cost realizations.  However, for
low cost realizations, bribery induces the honest supplier to bid less aggressively.11
In the remainder of the paper, we will examine these optimal bidding functions for a
convenient family of distributions. This family is convenient because it allows us to obtain closed
form solutions for the bids, prices, and market shares. Thus, we will be able to address a
number of interesting welfare and policy questions.
4.  The Bidding Functions for a Convenient Family of Distributions
In this section, we compute the equilibrium behavior and outcomes for a one-parameter
family of distribution functions G(c;t) on the costs of the suppliers.  For t > 0, define G(c;t) =
t c] 1 [ 1 - -  over the support [0,1]. The corresponding density function is g(c;t) = 1 ] 1 [ - - t c t .
The parameter t can be interpreted as the number of draws that a supplier would have from a
uniform cost distribution. As such,  t can be loosely interpreted as capacity because it
corresponds to the number of equal size plants owned by a supplier that could be used to
produce the good. In section 6 we will assume that t corresponds to an investment that reduces
costs.
Let the capacity of the honest supplier be th and that of the dishonest supplier be td.
When ti < tj, supplier i has a less favorable cost distribution in that there is a lower probability of
obtaining a cost below any given c. In other words, G(c;ti) < G(c;tj) for all c in the support, so
that the distribution for supplier j stochastically dominates that of supplier i.
With this specification for the distribution of costs, we can solve for the equilibrium
bidding functions implicitly defined by equations (2) and (5). The equilibrium bidding function of
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The equilibrium bidding function of the dishonest supplier is slightly more complicated.
When a £ td/th , the equilibrium bidding function of the dishonest supplier is everywhere above
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On the other hand, when a > td/th , (9a) is below the bidding function of the honest supplier.
However, the bidding function of the dishonest supplier cannot be below the lowest bid bh(0) of
the honest supplier. Otherwise, the dishonest supplier could raise his bid without reducing the
probability of winning the auction outright. Thus, the equilibrium bid of the dishonest supplier
must equal bh(0) for low cost realizations. For higher cost realizations, the equilibrium bidding
function will take the same form as equation (9a).
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. The cutoff cost c¢ for the equilibrium bidding function is defined as
the maximum cost at which the bidding function of the dishonest supplier equal the low bid of
the honest supplier, b c b d h ( ; ) ( ) ¢ = a 0 .
In a subsequent section, we will compare these bidding functions to the equilibrium
bidding functions in auctions without bribery.  But as a basic reference point, consider the
equilibrium bidding function of a first-price sealed-bid auction without bribery for the symmetric
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The comparison of the symmetric first-price auction with and without bribery is very clear. The
bidding function of the honest supplier from (9) is unchanged by the fact that the dishonest
supplier can bribe the auctioneer. Thus, he does not bid more aggressively in the presence of
bribery. We already know that this is not a general feature of our model and is a consequence
of our family of cost distributions.
3
On the other hand, the bidding function of the dishonest supplier from (9) is everywhere
above the bidding function without bribery from (10) for a < 1. In other words, as long as the
dishonest supplier retains some fraction of the surplus (bh - cd) after bribing the auctioneer, he
will bid less aggressively than the honest supplier. Again, this follows from the symmetry of cost
distributions, and is a direct consequence of the equivalence of the bidding behavior for the
honest supplier with and without bribery. In this case, the only effect of bribery is that losing the
auction is a less attractive alternative for the dishonest supplier.
As the percentage bribe decreases, the dishonest supplier retains more of the surplus,
and thus bids less aggressively. In other words, when the percentage bribe is high, the dishonest
supplier will bid more aggressively to win the contract outright and avoid the bride.  But when
the percentage bribe is low, the dishonest supplier can bid higher, knowing that he will still share
the surplus on the contracts that he could have won outright with a lower bid.
The extreme case of “favoritism” occurs when a = 0.  The auctioneer awards the
contract to the dishonest supplier whenever some surplus exists and accepts no bribe in return.
In this case, the bidding function of the dishonest supplier degenerates to bd(c;a) = 1, the
highest possible cost, irrespective of the actual cost realization. In effect, the dishonest supplier
does not bid in the auction, and relies on favoritism to obtain the contract whenever it is
profitable at the price bid by the honest supplier. As a result, the dishonest supplier will never
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of the symmetric honest bidding function. That is, the hazard rate of the distribution of bids is the same as
the hazard rate of the costs generating those bids. Then, the trade-off facing the honest bidder is the same
under honest behavior and under bribery.14
submit the low bid in the auction, and the bid of the honest supplier will always determine the
price.
5. Allocation Distortions and the Distribution of the Surplus
Having characterized the behavior of suppliers under bribery, we can now examine
several questions related to efficiency and distribution. The first of these questions is how
bribery affects the efficiency of the auction mechanism.
5.1 Bribes and allocation distortions
As we have already mentioned, the sealed-bid auction with bribery awards the contract
to the honest supplier whenever his bid is below the cost of the dishonest supplier. Since the bid
of the honest supplier is generally above his cost, this implies that our mechanism awards the








, is decreasing in c, as in our family of distribution functions, this allocative distortion
is greater when the cost of the honest supplier is lower. Indeed, in this case condition (3) implies
that (b-c) is decreasing in c for the honest supplier. That is, when  ch is small, the dishonest
supplier can win the contract even if  cd is significantly higher than  ch. When  ch is high, the
allocative distortion occurs only when the difference in cost is relatively small.
This allocative distortion does not depend on whether the dishonest supplier has a more
favorable cost distribution is (stronger) or less favorable cost distribution is (weaker) than the
honest supplier. In particular, the honest supplier may be weaker than the dishonest supplier,
and yet bribery discriminates against him. This contrasts with the type of distortion that arises in
a first-price auction without bribery, where the weaker supplier bids more aggressively than the
stronger supplier for equal cost realizations (see Lebrun 1999).
4
                                                
4 Also, see Waehrer (1999).15
 The type of allocative distortion is also very different under an optimal mechanism (from
the buyer's viewpoint) in absence of bribery. Again, an optimal mechanism would discriminate
against the stronger bidder. Thus, if the dishonest supplier is the stronger bidder, the optimal
mechanism discriminates in the opposite direction than the equilibrium discrimination induced by
bribery in the first-price auction. Finally, if the dishonest supplier is the weaker bidder, then both
the optimal mechanism and the first-price auction, with or without bribery, discriminate against
the stronger honest supplier. 
5 However, the optimal mechanism would typically have a wider
range of discrimination at high cost realizations of the stronger honest supplier. Exactly the
opposite is true in our case. See Figure 2.
To facilitate later results, it is convenient to analyze in some detail the region in which an
allocative distortion occurs and the region in which bribes are paid. The bid of the honest
supplier is one determinant of these regions. But since the bidding function of the honest supplier
is independent of the bidding strategy of the dishonest supplier and of the percentage bribe, we
can start by defining the bribery region at a given cost realization of the honest supplier ch. If the
dishonest supplier’s costs are very low, his bid will be lower than bh(ch), defined by (8), and he
will win the contract outright. However, once the costs of the dishonest supplier exceed the level
x(ch) defined by
(11) bd(x(ch)) = bh(ch),
then he must bribe the auctioneer in order to obtain the contract. In this case, the price paid by
the buyer is  bh(ch). If bd(0) > bh(0), then for low realizations of ch , x(ch) = 0.  Thus, we can
express the implicit function defined by (11) as
(12) x(ch)  =  
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x(ch)  =  0    otherwise.
                                                
5 See Myerson, (1981), and McAfee and McMillan, (1989).16
For cd < x(ch), the dishonest supplier wins the contract outright by submitting the low bid and
does not need to bribe the auctioneer. Note that c’’ > 0 only when  a < t d/th. And more
importantly, note that ch > x(ch) for every ch in this case, and only in this case. Indeed, the
bidding function of the honest supplier is everywhere below the bidding function of the dishonest
supplier. This will be important for the result in Proposition 1 below. It means that whenever the
dishonest supplier obtains the contract with a cost above that of the honest supplier it is because
he bribes the auctioneer. In the case where a > td/th, the dishonest supplier sometimes wins
outright even when his cost is higher than the cost of the honest supplier.
Finally, bribes (and allocative distortions) will occur only when there is a surplus to be
divided between the dishonest supplier and the auctioneer, that is, when the cost of the
dishonest supplier is less that the bid of the honest supplier. This means that when the cost of the
dishonest supplier exceeds bh(ch), the honest supplier is awarded the contract at his low bid
(see Figure 3).
5.2 The expected price for the buyer
The special form of discrimination that occurs under bribery raises the question of how
this distortion affects the price paid by the buyer. This is our second question. In principle,
bribery implies that part of the surplus generated by the transaction accrues to a third party, the
auctioneer. But what is the aggregate effect of this loss when combined with the allocative
distortion? A first answer to this question can be obtained by comparing the expected price for
the buyer in our bribery model with the expected price for the buyer in an efficient mechanism,
such as the second price auction with no bribery. Let  ) , ( 2 h d t t Ep represent the expected price
in a (honest) second price auction and  ) , ; ( h d t t Epa  represent the expected price in our first-
price auction with bribery. For our special family of cost distributions, the following proposition
provides the answer.17
Proposition 1:  (i) When td > th, the expected price in a first-price auction with bribery can be
below the expected price in a second-price auction without bribery. In particular, there exists a
set of percentage bribes ( , ] a1  such that for any a in this set,
). , ; ( ) , ( 2 h d h d t t Ep t t Ep a >
(ii) When td £ th, the expected price in a first-price auction with bribery can never be below the
expected price in a second-price auction without bribery. In particular,
Ep t t Ep t t d h d h 2( , ) ( ; , ) < a  for all a £ 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
At first glance, this result seems counterintuitive. One would expect that the buyer
obtains better deals when discriminating against the stronger supplier, thereby increasing
competitive pressure on the stronger supplier. However, the opposite occurs in this model.
When the honest supplier is the stronger bidder (case (ii) above), the bribery auction is not
better for the buyer than an efficient auction. This is again a special feature of our family of cost
distributions. To understand why, consider the price that a supplier expects to receive,
conditional on winning, in an honest second-price auction:




















In the case where i = h, this coincides with the bid (and thus the expected price conditional on
winning) of the honest supplier in our first-price auction with bribery. This is a special feature of
our family of distributions. As compared to a second-price auction, our mechanism does not
induce "more aggressive behavior" by the honest supplier. In particular, the outcome does not
extract a higher price from the buyer when the honest supplier wins. This also explains the result
in (ii), which again is special to the family of cost distributions.18
We now examine the more interesting and perhaps more surprising result in Proposition
1(i). Note that when a = 1, the right hand side in (13) is also the bidding function of the
dishonest supplier in our first-price auction with bribery. This means that if both suppliers always
paid their bid when winning and if both our auction and the second-price auction allocated the
contract in the same way, then the expected price paid by the buyer would also be the same in
both auctions. The differences could then be traced to the allocative distortion of our auction
and to the divergence between the bid and price received by the dishonest bidder. What is this
distortion and what is this divergence? In our case the distortion means that the dishonest
supplier will sometimes have a higher cost and still win. Since ch > x(ch) for every ch in our case
(i), whenever this distortion occurs the dishonest supplier receives a price equal to the honest
supplier’s bid, so that the distortion has no consequence for the buyer. However, the divergence
extends further. The dishonest supplier sometimes has a cost lower than  ch and higher than
x(ch). In this case, he wins the contract (as under the second-price auction), but only after
revising his bid and bribing the auctioneer. In other words, the price is the honest supplier’s bid
bh(ch) instead of the dishonest supplier’s bid bd(cd) > (bd(x(ch)) = bh(ch)). This is the difference
between second-price auction and our bribery auction, and results in a lower price for the buyer
when a = 1 (and by continuity, for sufficiently large a < 1).
6
There is another issue related to the effects of distortions on the expected price paid by
the buyer. As we know, a first-price auction is also a distortionary auction when bidders are
asymmetric. In fact, for the family of distributions that we are using, numerical computations
indicate that the distortion induced by first-price auctions is beneficial for the buyer.
7 Thus,
bribery may not be the driving force of Proposition 1(i), but the use of first-price auction. One
                                                
6 Notice that under the conditions in (ii) ch £  x(ch). That means that bribery only occurs when cd > ch with no
consequence for the price. However, when x(ch) > cd > ch  the dishonest supplier gets the contract outright,
receiving his bid bd (cd) (< bd (x(ch)) = bh(ch)). In our family of cost distributions this reduction in price is
outweighed by the fact that, in the case td < th, the bid of the dishonest supplier (equal to bh(0)) is above the
price he expects in a second-price auction when he wins with costs below  c' as defined in (9b) above.
7 See Marshall and al., (1994).19
would then like to know whether bribery could result in a reduction in the expected price for a
first-price auction.
Obtaining analytical solutions for the bidding functions and then the expected prices, in
an asymmetric first-price auction is a hopeless task. Thus we must rely on numerical solutions in
order to provide an answer. Using such computations, we can guarantee that
Proposition 2: The expected price in a first-price auction may increase or decrease as a
consequence of bribery.
The result in Proposition 2 can be obtained using numerical computations of first-price
auctions. Using the results in Marshall et al. (1994), when td = 4 and  th = 1, the expected price
paid by the buyer is .4943. Alternatively, with bribery and a = 1, the expected price is .4958.
Thus, bribery increases the expected price paid by the buyer. However, when td = 3 and  th =
2, the expected prices are .4125 and .4122, respectively. Thus, bribery actually reduces the
expected price for sufficiently high values of a .
5.3 The expected bribe
With bribery, the dishonest supplier prefers to retain a larger percentage of the surplus.  For any
given cost realization c and bid b, the profit function of the dishonest supplier is decreasing in a .
Thus, a lower percentage a retained by the auctioneer shifts the profit function of the dishonest
supplier upward. The bidding function of the dishonest supplier obviously depends on a , but
the envelope theorem implies that a lower percentage bribe will increase the expected profits of
the dishonest supplier. Also, the buyer prefers higher values of  a, since this increases the
dishonest supplier´s aggressiveness without affecting the behavior of the honest supplier. The
optimal value of a from the viewpoint of the auctioneer is less clear.
Ex post, the auctioneer would obviously prefer larger percentage bribes. However,
larger percentage bribes induce the dishonest supplier to bid lower, and thereby reduce the
probability that he needs to bribe in order to obtain the contract. To analyze the solution to this
tradeoff, we can use the definitions of the function x(ch) obtained in subsection 5.1. Using these20
functions (indexed by a), we can express the expected bribery revenue of the auctioneer in
terms of the percentage bribe.
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The first term is positive. It represents the gain obtained when bribes are still paid. However, the
second is negative, and represents the loss from lower probabilities of receiving bribes. The
following proposition shows that the tradeoff between these effects always has an interior
solution.
Proposition 3. If td < th, then the percentage bribe which maximizes the auctioneer’s revenues





 < 1. If td > th the revenue-maximizing  a* is smaller 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The optimal a* for the auctioneer may be very small. If  h d t t /  is small, a*  is clearly
small. Indeed, in case where the dishonest supplier is not a serious rival to the honest supplier
his behavior without bribery would be very aggressive, with bids very close to cost. This means
that the scope for bribes is very limited. If the dishonest supplier bids above the honest supplier
it is probably because his cost is above the bid of the honest supplier. In response, the
auctioneer prefers a lower a in order to make the dishonest supplier less aggressive. This
increases the probability of having surplus to share.21
The optimal percentage bribe need not be large even when the cost distributions of the
two suppliers are similar. When  td = th = 1, we find that the optimal percentage bribe is
approximately 13%.
6.  Investment in Cost Reduction
Proposition 1 found that there exist circumstances in which the presence of bribery can
actually result in a lower expected price paid by the buyer. This finding relied on the assumption
that the cost distribution parameters, td and th, of the suppliers were fixed. As we mentioned
before, we can interpret these parameters as units of capacity, and as such, they could be
increased at a cost. In this section, we explore what would happen if the suppliers could choose
these cost parameters or capacities before the auction. Bribery affects the expected profits and
thus will affect the incentive to invest in capacity prior to the auction.  Although it is difficult to
infer marginal incentives to invest from the effect of bribery on the expected profits, we should
expect that the incentive to invest will be lower for the honest supplier.  For the dishonest
supplier, the magnitude of the percentage bribe should affect the incentive to invest.  We should
expect that the incentive to invest will be lower when the dishonest supplier pays a larger
percentage of the surplus in the bribe to the auctioneer.  However, this intuition could be
affected by the shifts in the equilibrium bidding function of the dishonest supplier which arise
from changes in the percentage bribe.
Before examining the incentive to invest in the presence of bribery, we first calculate the
aggregate investment for a social optimum. Let f  be the cost of one unit of capacity. If each unit
of capacity is a plant that can produce the good, then f  is the fixed cost of constructing the
plant. In order to maximize social welfare, the capacities of the suppliers should minimize the
sum of the fixed costs and the production costs. The  industry fixed costs are simply
) ( h d t t f + ￿ . With the family of distribution functions G(c;t), the expected cost of producing the
good can be expressed as 
1 ) 1 (
- + + h d t t . Let the industry capacity be represented by
h d t t T + = . The distribution of capacity among the two suppliers does not affect either the22
industry fixed costs or the industry production costs. Thus, the social optimum is obtained by
minimizing 
1 ) 1 (
- + - ￿ T T f .  The solution is  1 *
2 / 1 - =
- f T .  Clearly, f  must be less than one.
This efficient level of investment can be attained with second-price auctions. Indeed,
assume the suppliers choose capacity in the first stage and then compete in a second-price
auction to win the contract in the second stage. For the family of distribution functions G(c;t),















Supplier h has the corresponding expression for expected profits.
8 The first-order condition for
each supplier generates a unit-sloped reaction function with the form  1
2 / 1 - = +
- f t t h d . Thus,
there is a multiplicity of equilibria. However, all the equilibria have the same efficient industry
capacity,  * T t t h d = + . With this background, we can now consider the incentives to invest by
the suppliers in the first-price auction with bribery.
The expected profits of the honest supplier are more tractable than the expected profits
of the dishonest supplier because the honest supplier only earns profits when his bid is lower
that the cost realization of the dishonest supplier.  Including the fixed capacity costs, the



























The expected profits of the honest supplier are independent of the percentage bribe again. The
reaction function of the honest supplier can be obtained from the first-order condition for
maximizing the expected profits, given the capacity of the dishonest supplier. This reaction
function takes the following form:23






















It is straightforward to show that this reaction function is downward sloping. Thus, the honest
supplier acquires less capacity when the dishonest supplier has a greater capacity.  Clearly, the
fixed costs f  must be sufficiently less than one in order to ensure that the honest supplier
acquires some capacity. The reaction function of the honest supplier answers one of the natural
questions about bribery.  We state the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Bribery results in a lower level of cost-reducing investment for the industry than
does the social optimum (or the second-price auction without bribery).
Proof:  Upon rearranging the reaction function of the honest supplier, we find that the optimal
response of the honest supplier would ensure that the sum of his capacity and that of the















2 / 1 - f  - 1. Thus, irrespective of the capacity choice of the
dishonest supplier, the profit-maximizing response of the honest supplier will prevent the industry
from reaching the socially optimal investment. Q.E.D.
This proposition is interesting because it confirms that bribery in this model undermines
the aggregate incentive to invest in lower cost technologies. This investment effect is probably
more important than the static price effects of bribery. Lower industry investment increases the
expected cost of the good.  As we pointed out, the expected cost is simply 
1 ) 1 (
- +T .
Depending on the distribution of that capacity among the suppliers, this higher expected cost
would generally result in higher prices to the buyer.
                                                                                                                                                
8  The general derivation of the expected profits of asymmetric suppliers using this family of distributions
can be found in Perry and Waehrer (1998).24
The expected profits of the dishonest supplier are much more complicated functions of
the capacity levels and the percentage bribe. We know that lower percentage bribes result in
higher incentives for cost reduction. For any decrease in cost, the dishonest supplier retains a
higher surplus. We can illustrate the impact of the percentage bribe on the incentive to invest by
the dishonest supplier. Consider the symmetric case in which the two suppliers have a capacity
of 1, that is, they each have one plant. After differentiating the expected profits of the dishonest
supplier with respect to   d t  and simplifying, we find that
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This expression is the marginal return to an additional unit of capacity.  It is easy to show that
this marginal return is decreasing in a, takes a positive value at a = 0, and is negative at a = 1.
In order for the unit capacities to be an equilibrium, the values of f  and a must be such
that first-order conditions for both suppliers are satisfied. This is feasible because the value of a
does not affect the first-order condition of the honest supplier.  Thus, f  can be set to satisfy the
first-order condition of the honest supplier (
18
1
= f ), while a can then be set to satisfy the first-
order condition of the dishonest supplier ( 1






a ). With these
parameters, the social optimum industry capacity is slightly above 3. Thus, we have constructed
an equilibrium with identical capacities for the two suppliers, the sum of which is less than the
social optimum.
If a is lower, then the dishonest supplier will have an incentive to acquire more than one
unit of capacity. The reaction function of the honest supplier in (18) implies that he would then
acquire less than one unit of capacity. Thus, a small percentage bribe or favoritism will generate
an equilibrium in which the dishonest supplier acquires a larger capacity than the honest supplier.
Conversely, a large percentage bribe will generate an equilibrium in which the dishonest supplier25
acquires a smaller capacity than the honest supplier. Although these results are confined to this
example, their implications merit the following summary remark.
Remark:  Favoritism and small percentage bribes can encourage the dishonest supplier to
invest in cost-reducing capacity more than the honest supplier, rendering this supplier more
competitive. Large percentage bribes discourage such investments.
One of the natural applications of this model in international economics is the setting in
which the dishonest supplier is the domestic firm with access to the domestic political process.
In this situation, the honest supplier is the foreign firm with no such access or with specific legal
prohibitions against bribery of foreign officials.  The remark implies that favoritism to domestic
suppliers can encourage investment in cost reducing capacity. Contrary to some traditional
arguments, favoritism creates a dynamic inefficiency in this model, but the dishonest supplier,
who is partially protected from competition, may now increase his investment in cost reduction.
The same conclusion also applies to bribery environments with low percentage bribes.
7. Discussion of Alternative Modeling of Bribes in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Modeling the bribery process requires making choices as to how game theory can be
used to represent a complex bargaining situations with implicit understandings and ill-defined
exchanges. In this section, we will discuss the choices we have made to model bribery in
auctions and their alternatives.
First, we have tried to avoid a definition of bribery that simply converts an honest
auction to supply products to the buyer into an “honest” auction to supply products to the
auctioneer who then resells the products to the buyer. This would occur if the auctioneer had
enough power to make all parties abide by agreements prior to the auction. Even without
assuming such power, the bribe could still take several forms.
In this paper, we assumed that the bribe is a percentage of the surplus between the low
bid of the honest supplier and the cost of the dishonest supplier. The percentage bribe is more26
convenient because bribery will occur whenever the surplus is positive, no matter how small,
which simplifies the analysis.
 9 This model can be thought of as representing ex post bargaining
between the auctioneer and the dishonest supplier about the division of the surplus. The
magnitude of the percentage bribe would then represent the bargaining power of the auctioneer.
An alternative would be to model the bribe as a fixed amount that the dishonest supplier must
pay to the auctioneer irrespective of the low bid by the honest supplier, the cost realization of
dishonest supplier, and thus magnitude of the surplus. The justification for such a “fixed bribe” is
that the auctioneer may face potential penalties from accepting a bribe and that these penalties
are independent of the amount of the bribe. Thus, there is a minimum bribe that warrants bearing
the risks of incurring penalties for accepting the bribe. With a fixed bribe, the cost realization of
the dishonest supplier must be sufficiently below the bid of the honest supplier in order to
generate a surplus that exceeds the minimum fixed bribe acceptable to the auctioneer.
If we assumed that the fixed bribe is  b, the honest supplier would become less
aggressive. The honest supplier no longer has to underbid the cost of the dishonest supplier, but
instead only needs to underbid the cost plus the fixed bribe. This shifts his bidding function
upwards. On the other hand, the dishonest bidder faces a new lower bound in his bid. Indeed,
the dishonest bidder never bids below the value b that solves



















For higher values of the cost, the dishonest supplier faces the same tradeoff as in (5) if we set a
= 1, except that the bid of the honest supplier is shifted. This results in less aggressive behavior
than in our most aggressive case (a = 1). However, for low values of the fixed bribe ß and








the new lower bound does not bind and the bidding behavior of both suppliers converges to our
                                                
9  One justification for the percentage bribe is that the auctioneer receives an equity interest in the
dishonest supplier in return for awarding the contract to the dishonest supplier at the lower price bid by the
honest supplier.  Historically, this is not an uncommon form of bribery.27
most competitive case (a = 1). Thus, our results should still hold, including the surprising results
in Proposition 1 (i).
Another alternative to our model of bribery is to assume that the dishonest supplier can
also bribe when he is the high bidder. Indeed, even when the dishonest supplier submits the
lowest bid, there is some extra surplus that the auctioneer and the dishonest can appropriate by
allowing the dishonest supplier to raise his bid ex post up to the bid of the honest supplier.
Notice that this creates greater latitude for the auctioneer. The bribe in our model was seemingly
innocuous for the buyer because the auctioneer could not change the price of the contract, only
who was awarded the contract. In contrast, it is more serious to allow the auctioneer to
manipulate the auction so that the final price could exceed the low bid and equal the high bid.
We now discuss the consequences of this higher degree of latitude for the auctioneer.
Assume that, if the honest supplier has bid  h b  and the dishonest supplier has bid
h d b b < , the auctioneer would allow the dishonest supplier to revise his bid upward to (almost)
h b  in exchange of a payment  ) ( d h b b - a . This would not change the behavior of the honest
supplier. He would still win only when his bid is below the cost of the dishonest supplier. The
profit for the dishonest supplier would be  ) )( 1 ( c bh - -a if his bid is above that of the honest
supplier (but his cost is below this value), and  ) ( ) )( 1 ( c b b b d d h - + - -a if his bid is below that
of the honest supplier. In other words, the dishonest supplier makes  ) )( 1 ( c bh - -a irrespective
of how his bid compares to that of the honest supplier, and makes additional  ) ( c bd - a profits if
his bid is below that of the honest supplier (provided his cost is below the bid of the honest
supplier). Notice that the first term is independent of his bid, as is the probability of his cost
being below the bid of the honest supplier. Then his bid determines whether he makes
) ( c bd - a  by winning the contract honestly or not. That is the same tradeoff (multiplied by a
constant) that the dishonest supplier faces in our original model when  1 = a . The optimal bid is
therefore the same, as is the allocation of the contract. Indeed, the problem faced by the
dishonest supplier with this two-way bribing is28
(21)         
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a a a ,
and since the first term in the right-hand side is a constant in b, (21) is equivalent to (4) when
1 = a . The behavior of the suppliers is then the same as one case of our original model. An
important difference, however, is that the price is now always the bid of the honest supplier.
Thus, the expected price paid by the buyer would always be higher under bribery.
One other modeling issue that we want to address is our assumption that the auctioneer
knows the cost of the dishonest supplier. This assumption may be reasonable in a situation
where the dishonest supplier and the auctioneer have a long-run relationship. This is consistent
with our differentiation between the honest and dishonest suppliers. Nevertheless, one can
criticize this assumption as extreme, and ask what happens if the auctioneer has to infer the cost
of the dishonest supplier from the bidding behavior. Thus, assume the auctioneer does not know
the cost of the dishonest supplier. If there is still a strictly monotone, pure strategy equilibrium
bidding function for the dishonest supplier, then the auctioneer can still infer this cost from the
bid. Thus, when bargaining over the bribe, the cost of the dishonest supplier is already common
knowledge. Of course, the incentives for the dishonest supplier when deciding his bid are now
different. In particular, they include the signaling aspect of his bid. Indeed, in equilibrium, the
auctioneer would postulate a bidding function for the dishonest supplier,  b(c), and after
observing a bid b of the dishonest supplier, ask for a bribe equal to   a(bh-b
-1(b)). Thus, the
problem faced by the dishonest supplier would be to choose the best cost report, that is,
(22)   
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For b(c) to be the equilibrium bidding function, truthful reporting should be the best choice. This
generates the following differential equation as the necessary condition for equilibrium29
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A fully revealing equilibrium should be a strictly monotone solution of this differential equation
with b(1)=1. For the uniform case (and a = 1), this equilibrium exists and is represented in
Figure 4 below.
Notice that the new signaling effect, represented by the last term in (23), is positive.
When evaluated in the equilibrium bid when costs are known to the auctioneer, the incentive for
the dishonest supplier is to raise his bid in order to reduce the bribe paid when a bribe is
needed. This is what we should expect. This raises an existence  problem because this effect
may be sufficiently strong so that every type (or at least high enough types) bids 1. If so, a fully
revealing equilibrium would not exist.
7. Concluding remarks
We have analyzed a model of bribery in competitive procurement. One of the suppliers
can revise his bid by bribing the auctioneer. Once the bids are submitted, the auctioneer lets this
dishonest supplier know what the bid of the other supplier has been. In exchange the auctioneer
receives a percentage of the surplus generated. The dishonest supplier still submits meaningful
bids since winning the auction outright avoids paying bribe.
We have characterized the behavior of the suppliers in this setting. The chance of
bribing and winning the contract even after submitting a losing bid could be expected to induce
less aggressive behavior for the dishonest supplier. Similarly, we might expect that the honest
supplier would bid more aggressively because he must bid below the cost of the dishonest
supplier to eliminate the surplus, prevent bribery, and win the contract. We have shown that this
is not true in general. The honest supplier bids against the cost of the dishonest supplier, which
may be steeper than his bidding function, the standard target in an honest auction. Similarly,
bribery does not necessarily make the dishonest supplier bid less aggressively.30
Bribery distorts the allocation in favor of the dishonest supplier. This occurs whether or
not the honest supplier’s cost distribution stochastically dominates that of the dishonest supplier.
This contrasts with what happens in an honest second-price auction, where the allocation is
efficient. But it also contrasts with the result in a first-price auction when the honest supplier is
the weaker bidder. In a first-price auction, the strong bidder bids less aggressively than the
weaker bidder, and the allocative distortion favors the weaker bidder. This is also true for
optimal mechanisms from the buyer’s viewpoint.
The effect of this distortion and the bribe on the expected price paid by the buyer is
ambiguous. As a consequence of bribery, the expected price can be lower compared to both
the price in a second-price auction or an honest first-price auction. This can occur even if the
dishonest supplier is the stronger bidder, in terms of stochastic dominance of his cost
distribution. In fact, for the family of distributions considered, the dishonest supplier must be the
stronger bidder in order for a reduction in the expected price to follow from bribery.
Finally, we have analyzed how the relative ex post bargaining power (bribe percentage)
of the auctioneer and dishonest supplier affect the payoffs of all parties. The buyer prefers that
the auctioneer has all the bargaining power. This makes the dishonest supplier more aggressive
in the auction. The dishonest supplier has exactly the opposite interest. Although ex post the
auctioneer would prefer to have all the bargaining power, he would choose an intermediate
degree of bargaining power ex ante, which maximizes his revenues in  light of the equilibrium
bidding strategy of the dishonest supplier.31
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Using the results in the previous section, we can calculate the expected
price paid by the buyer as
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The expected price in a second-price auction is very easy to calculate for asymmetric
cases using this specification for the distribution of costs:
 (25)   
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(i) When td > th, expression (24a) for the expected price applies over the entire range of the
percentage bribe of a £ 1. This expected price is continuous and declines as a  increases over
this range. At a = 0, this expected price with bribery is clearly greater than the expected price
under a second-price auction without bribery from (25).  However, at a = 1, the condition that
td > th implies that this expected price with bribery is lower than the expected price under a
second-price auction without bribery. Thus, there exists a a such that for a >a, bribery
would result in a lower expected price.
(ii) When td < th, expression (24a) for the expected price applies only for a £ td/th. But under
the condition that td < th, this expected price is greater that the expected price under a second-
price auction without bribery from (25) at a = td/th, and thus for all a £ td/th.
When td = th, expression (24a) applies for all a £ 1, exceeds the expected price without bribery
for a < 1, and equals the expected price without bribery for a = 1. Q.E.D.34
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The expression in brackets is concave in h t a , so we only need to check the sign at  h t a = td and
h t a ﬁ¥. In the first case, the expression takes the value






































(26) is negative and we can conclude that the expected bribe is decreasing in a in that region.
If td > th, then x(ch) is zero when for    ch > 
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. Thus, the left-hand
side above, for  th < td , is smaller than
( ) 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 3 1 ( ) 1 (
2 < + + + + + + + + + - h h h d d h h d t t t t t t t t .
Therefore,  1 = a  is not the optimal percentage bribe. Q.E.D.35









Bidding functions when 
2 ) ( ) ( c c G c G d h = =
no bribery: dashed curve
honest supplier: darker curve
dishonest supplier: lighter line36









Bidding functions when  c c F c F d h = = ) ( ) ( , a = 1
Honest bidder: linear curve
Dishonest bidder: concave curve